***Please note: FPI is in the process of correcting the range provided in this report for the share of property tax revenue that makes up school district revenue. We are working quickly to provide the adjusted figure and will update this post accordingly***

In Florida, the ability of local governments to raise revenue for operations is limited by the state constitution.^[1] With the exception of fees, special assessments,^[2] and the property tax, also known as an ad valorem tax, local governments are dependent on the Legislature and state laws for authority to levy other forms of taxation and raise revenue. Consequently, as a matter of fiscal management and local autonomy, the property tax is paramount.

Considering recent policy proposals to eliminate property taxes (see Appendix), this brief explores the property tax, its role as a source of local fiscal autonomy, possibilities for reform, and the consequences of replacing property taxes with other revenue options.

Understanding Property Taxes in Florida

The property tax is a collection of taxes on several different types of property, which can be grouped into two broad categories: real and personal. Real property is immobile and includes land, natural resources, and fixed improvements to the land. Personal property is mobile and includes tangible property (e.g., furniture, equipment, inventory, and vehicles), as well as intangible property (e.g., stocks, taxable bonds, and bank accounts). Due to the difficulty of establishing ownership, only a few states include intangible property in their tax base. A third, smaller category is state-assessed property (e.g., railroads and other public utilities), which spans several local jurisdictions and whose specialized use makes appraisal by the state more efficient. 

According to the Florida Department of Revenue’s (DOR’s) latest property tax base statistics, real property accounts for 94 percent of taxable value, while personal property accounts for nearly 6 percent.^[3] Although real property is, and has been, a staple of Florida’s property tax base at the local level,^[4] between 1931 and 2006, the state government also levied a tax on intangible property, including stocks, bonds, and bank notes, in addition to a one-time tax payment on mortgages. However, policymakers repealed the tax on stocks, bonds, and notes in 2006.^[5] The outcome of this change disproportionately benefited wealthy white households at the expense of tax fairness. According to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in 2007, 34 percent of Black households, 27 percent of Latina/o households, and about 60 percent of white households owned stocks.^[6] 

Intangible property, which comprises a large share of the assets of the wealthy, is not taxed until the owner sells it. At this point, capital gains — or the income generated by an intangible asset’s rise in value over time — are taxed, though at a lower rate than wages and salaries. Furthermore, since Florida does not have a personal income tax, the state has no way of collecting capital gains beyond the intangible property tax.

Although real property is, and has been, a staple of Florida’s property tax base at the local level, between 1931 and 2006, the state government also levied a tax on intangible property, including stocks, bonds, and bank notes, in addition to a one-time tax payment on mortgages. However, policymakers repealed the tax on stocks, bonds, and notes in 2006.

The 2006 repeal of the state’s intangible property tax has had a long-lasting impact on state revenue collections. In fiscal year (FY) 1999-00, Florida’s intangible tax on stocks, bonds, and notes generated nearly $1 billion annually.^[7] A decade later, in FY 2009-2010, revenue dropped to $174 million.^[8] Today, what remains of the state’s intangible property tax (i.e., the non-recurring tax on liens and the recurring tax on government leaseholds) is set to raise $452 million in FY 2024-25.^[9]

As the Florida Timeline notes,^[10] if policymakers reinstated the tax on intangible property, they could raise over $2 billion annually.^[11] Given that Florida does not have a personal income tax, this policy would offset wealth and income inequality, which currently contributes to the state’s reputation as the most regressive in the country, per the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.^[12]

The state’s tax on intangible property notwithstanding, Florida’s tax on real property, which makes up 18 percent of county revenue, 17 percent of municipal revenue, and  ̶ ̶̶̶5̶̶̶0̶̶̶ ̶̶̶t̶̶̶o̶̶̶ ̶̶̶7̶̶̶3̶̶̶ ̶̶̶p̶̶̶e̶̶̶r̶̶̶c̶̶̶e̶̶̶n̶̶̶t̶̶̶ of school district revenue^[13] [please see note in italics at the top of his page--FPI is in the process of updating this range] is — effectively — the domain of local governments. The real property tax strengthens their ability to address local needs, including fire and police services, education, and safety net programs.^[14] The tax has proved remarkably resilient and capable of being tailored to local interests, and it survives as the most important source of revenue in local governments primarily because of its stability.

Property Tax Revenue and Local Option Sales Taxes

In a densely populated state like Florida, if policymakers wanted to eliminate property taxes, they would need to raise $43 billion (or $2,015 per capita) to maintain public services currently funded with property tax revenue. (See Figure 1.)^[15] Moreover, in states that prohibit different types of taxation (e.g., nine states do not collect personal income taxes, including Florida), designing an equitable and balanced tax system is difficult. In Florida, eliminating property taxes would not only erode local fiscal autonomy — it would also exacerbate the state’s reliance on sales taxes, which disproportionately overburden families and workers with low to moderate income.^[16]

Proposals to eliminate property taxes, or study the impact of eliminating them, typically rely on budget cuts or sales tax increases (see Appendix) to account for declining revenue. Regarding sales taxes, as of January 2023, 10 states, including Florida, collect a 6 percent general sales tax; 20 states have lower sales taxes and 15 states have higher state rates than Florida (in comparison, California has the highest state rate set at 7.25 percent).^[17] Assuming constant demand despite rate changes, increasing Florida’s sales tax rate by one percentage point would raise approximately $6.7 billion annually.^[18] If policymakers were to eliminate property taxes and replace them with higher consumption taxes (i.e., sales taxes), they would have to double the state’s general sales tax rate. Doing so would generate roughly $40.2 billion in the unlikely case that consumer demand remains constant. Doubling the tax rate to 12 percent would make Florida’s general sales tax the highest in the nation, disproportionately and negatively impacting households with low to moderate incomes in addition to businesses (who contribute 20 percent of all sales tax revenue in the state) and tourists (who contribute 14 percent).^[19] Furthermore, periods of high inflation would exacerbate the negative impacts of doubling the state's general sales tax rate.

Relatedly, sales tax revenue is less stable than property tax revenue, meaning that tying all of the public services currently supported by local property taxes — good schools, public safety, and community programs — to general state sales taxes would make funding more susceptible to cuts and instability during economic downturns.

In lieu of a statewide sales tax increase, local governments could try to maximize their local option sales taxes. Under Florida law, nine different types of local option sales taxes are available to governments based on voter approval or referendum.^[20] As Table 1 shows, during the 2024-25 local fiscal year (LFY),^[21] 60 county governments and 31 school districts levied one or more local discretionary sales surtaxes and raised an estimated $5.73 billion in revenue. If all county governments and school districts in the Sunshine State collected all possible local option surtaxes at their maximum rate, they would raise an estimated $13.2 billion, enough to cover only about a third of property tax revenue. At the same time, increasing sales taxes, whether it is at the local level or statewide, is a regressive option that would ultimately make Florida’s tax code more inequitable.

Issues with Property Taxes

 As the Tax Policy Center explains, the first goal of the property tax is to raise revenue for local governments to finance schools, roads, parks, police protection, and firefighting services.^[22] The property tax meets this goal by supporting nearly one-third of local government operations across the United States. (See Figure 2.) In Florida, the tax supports nearly 28 percent of local government services.

However, the property tax is not flawless. Like consumption taxes, the property tax is regressive.^[23] For homeowners, home values as a share of income tend to decline at higher incomes. Homes also represent a larger share of total wealth for the middle class, whereas most of the net worth of wealthy families consists of corporate and business equity that tends to be exempt from property taxes. As a result, homeowners with low to moderate income spend more of their budget paying their property tax than wealthy homeowners.^[24] For example, households making less than $61,500 annually spend 3.5 percent to 5.5 percent of their income paying property taxes. In comparison, households earning more than $735,700 annually only spend 1.6 percent of their income paying property taxes.^[25] 

Additionally, inaccuracies in property tax assessments often result in high-value homes being taxed on a fraction of their value compared to low-value homes. At the same time, Black and Latina/o homeowners tend to owe higher property tax bills than white homeowners in nearby neighborhoods because of issues with the assessment process.^[26] Researchers suggest several reasons for this disparity, including:

• Owners of higher-priced properties are generally more successful when they appeal county assessments
• White homeowners receive preferential treatment during the appeal process
• County assessors do not always have access to comparable sales (nor other methods or data) to establish the market value of higher-priced properties
• There is a long history of systemic racism in assessment practices^[27],[28]

Property taxes' impact on racial equity is multifaceted. Relatedly, persistent disparities in housing policies and mortgage lending have placed homeownership out of reach for many families of color.^[29] Significant differences in intergenerational wealth have enabled many white families to receive substantial inheritances that they can use as a down payment on a home, a privilege less frequently accessible to people of color. While Black and Latina/o homeowners experience higher assessments, a 2018 report also discovered that a home in a majority Black neighborhood was valued, on average, 23 percent less than a similar home in a majority white neighborhood, even after considering differences in home and neighborhood attributes.^[30]

While eliminating property taxes would solve inaccuracies in property tax assessments by making them obsolete, it would also exacerbate long-standing inequities by either cutting nearly a third of public services or making the state’s tax code more regressive. Fortunately, policymakers have access to other public policy options to ensure the property tax can continue to support public services in a progressive manner.

Current Property Tax Relief

Policymakers can use tax expenditures like exemptions, credits, and preferential rates for homeowners to make property taxes more equitable. Across the country, the least regressive property taxes use homestead exemptions and low-income property tax credits. In Florida, for example, the current constitution, adopted in 1968, includes several tax exemptions, such as for:

• municipal property used exclusively for public purposes
• property used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes
• people who are widowed, blind, or totally or permanently disabled
• homesteads (a person’s principal residence in Florida)

Since 1968, policymakers and voters have amended the constitution to add more tax exemptions, including the notable "Save Our Homes" (SOH) amendment in 1992.^[31] For the 2024-25 fiscal year, Florida’s property tax relief is projected to be nearly $32 billion. This is largely due to Florida’s property tax rate limits under SOH, homestead exemptions, and other tax privileges shown in Table 2.‍

Studies show that Florida’s homestead exemptions and SOH help address inequities in the property tax code and make it less regressive. Without Florida’s homestead exemptions and SOH provision, Black homeowners, Latina/o homeowners, and owners of lower-priced properties would face higher property taxes compared to wealthier and/or white homeowners due to higher property assessments.^[32]

While tax expenditures like homestead exemptions and SOH help mitigate inequalities in Florida’s property tax system, they are not without issues. Homeowners must actively apply for these tax preferences and provide evidence that their home is their primary residence. The uptake of these benefits varies across the state, with higher rates in neighborhoods where residents are more aware of the exemptions and where the administrative process is straightforward. However, research indicates that in areas with online application options, the uptake of homestead exemptions and SOH among Black homeowners, Latina/o homeowners, and owners of lower-priced properties is lower compared to wealthier and/or white homeowners.^[33] This discrepancy in uptake rates, coupled with unequal assessment practices, highlights deficiencies in Florida’s property tax code that hinder its ability to promote equity.

Alternatives for Reform

As Andrew W. Kahrl explains in a guest essay for New York Times,^[34] the property tax ought to be a fair one: the higher the value of one’s property, the more one pays. The issue, as Kahrl notes, is that:

“The tax is administered by local officials who enjoy a remarkable degree of autonomy and that tax rates are typically based on the collective wealth of a given community. This results in wealthy communities enjoying lower effective tax rates while generating more tax revenues; at the same time, poorer ones are forced to tax property at higher effective rates while generating less in return. As such, property assessments have been manipulated throughout our nation’s history to ensure that valuable property is taxed the least relative to its worth and that the wealthiest places will always have more resources than poorer ones.”

Instead of federal action, Florida policymakers have options that meet the “ability to pay principle,” which requires that the total tax burden is based on an individual’s capacity to bear it. The options include: reenacting the state’s tax on intangibles like stocks, bonds, and notes; reenacting sales taxes on luxury services; and enacting a mansion tax. These options would not only make Florida’s tax code more equitable — they would also raise billions to boost public services and tax credits.

Reenact Florida’s Tax on Intangible Property 

In the fiscal years preceding the repeal of Florida’s tax on stocks, bonds, and notes (i.e., intangible property), the state offered a $250,000 exemption to taxpayers ($500,000 for a married couple) on the intangible property tax. At the time, the exemption cut the tax base by roughly 40 percent, ensuring only individuals with intangible assets worth more than $250,000 paid the tax of 50 cents for every $1,000. Today, if policymakers reenacted the tax using the same rate (50 cents for every $1,000, or a 0.5 mill levy on stocks, bonds, and notes), they could potentially raise between $319 million (with a $250,000 exemption) to $532 million (without the exemption). The state constitution caps the tax at 2 mills, which means the tax could generate between $1.3 to $2.1 billion, annually.

Reenact Florida’s Sales Tax on Services for Luxury Services

After serving as mayor of Tampa, Bob Martinez became Florida’s 40th governor. As governor, Martinez briefly supported one of the largest tax increases in the state’s history: Florida’s short-lived services tax. The Legislature passed the tax in 1987; however, due to corporate backlash, it was repealed later that same year during a special session.^[35] Unlike the general sales tax, expanding the taxation of services can make the tax code fairer by making it less regressive if it applies to those services predominantly purchased by affluent households — country club memberships, the services of investment counselors, or swimming pool cleaning services,^[36] to name just a few. For example, annually, a 6 percent tax could generate:

• $21 million from scenic and sightseeing transportation services
• $38 million from amusement and recreation services like physical fitness facilities, dance studios, and golf courses
• $75 million from travel arrangement and reservation services
• $306 million from nonscheduled chartered passenger air transportation (e.g., private flights)
• $436 million from securities and commodity contracts intermediation and brokerage services

Create a Mansion Tax

Another option is to adopt a tax on the sale of high-value homes, also known as a “mansion tax.” Across the country, 33 states — including Florida — and D.C. have real estate transfer taxes. Currently, Florida levies a “documentary stamp tax” of 70 cents per $100 on deeds and other documents related to real property. Policymakers could expand the state’s documentary stamp tax to include an additional tax on real estate sales above $1 million. As such, only the portion above $1 million of a real estate sale would be subject to a tax.^[37] As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and ITEP estimate, a 4 percent tax on portions above $1 million would generate $1.46 billion annually.^[38]

Create a Circuit Breaker Program

Property tax “circuit breakers,” like the devices that shut off electric power to prevent circuits from overloading, prevent property taxes from “overloading” a family’s budget by “shutting off” property taxes once they exceed a certain share of the family’s income. According to ITEP, as of 2023, most states (29 and the District of Columbia) offer some kind of circuit breaker, though these policies vary widely in size and scope. Another 16 states, including Florida, offer an income-limited property tax cut that falls short of being a true circuit breaker. There are just five states that do not offer any kind of income-targeted property tax break: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas.^[39]

Property tax “circuit breakers,” like the devices that shut off electric power to prevent circuits from overloading, prevent property taxes from “overloading” a family’s budget by “shutting off” property taxes once they exceed a certain share of the family’s income.

Circuit breakers are the only type of property tax cut explicitly designed to reduce the property tax load on those most affected by the tax. The most common type of circuit breaker program is designed to offer tax credits or rebates using a formula that compares property tax liability to income and offsets some or all the property tax that exceeds what is designated as unaffordable under the program^.[40],[41]  The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) explains that since Florida does not have a personal income tax, a circuit breaker program would have to be administered as a direct rebate whereby applicants must either attach a copy of their federal tax returns or other income-related documents.^[42]

Foreseeable Consequences of Eliminating Property Taxes

If policymakers continue to pursue eliminating property taxes outright without a cohesive plan to raise taxes in a progressive manner, some of the consequences are clear:

• Households with low to moderate income, including both property owners and renters, will end up paying more in taxes, as a percentage of their earnings, compared to wealthy residents if sales taxes increase to make up the lost revenue.
• Local governments would lose fiscal autonomy as they would no longer collect property taxes, and they would become dependent on the state for funding (whether it is for schools or other public services like police and fire services).
• Individuals who currently claim a property tax deduction in their federal income tax returns would lose the deduction; meaning their personal income taxes could potentially increase.
• The state government would have to weigh local funding needs alongside statewide services, leading to competition and underfunding if the state’s tax base (presumably sales tax base) shrinks.

Instead of eliminating property taxes, policymakers have options to increase revenue, which could be used to offer property tax relief while also increasing the quality of public services. As mentioned, policymakers could turn to the state’s intangible property tax, a services tax, a circuit breaker program, or a mansion tax. Additionally, they could ensure that all Floridians who qualify for the state’s homestead exemption and SOH receive them by raising awareness, particularly in communities of color. They could use more-targeted tax credits to ensure both renters and homeowners most impacted by Florida’s regressive tax code receive relief. Another option is to pass the Working Floridians Tax Rebate.^[43]  

Appendix

During the 2024 regular Legislative Session, the House’s Ways and Means Committee passed House Bill 1371 to direct the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) to “study the potential impact of eliminating all property tax and replacing lost revenue through the establishment of a consumption tax.”^[44] Although the bill died in its subsequent committee stop, throughout the country, groups are advocating for similar, if not more extreme, measures:

• In 2023, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bills 2 and 3, which, as Every Texan explains, “increased the homestead exemption to $100,000, reduced the M&O [a school district’s maintenance and operations tax rate] by $0.107 per $100 of property value, enacted a temporary cap on non-homestead residential and commercial property, and exempted more small businesses from the franchise tax among other provisions.”^[45] Following passage, the property tax changes made it into the November 2023 ballot, and Texas voters ultimately approved the $18.6 billion cut without a new source of revenue to replace lost property tax collections.^[46] Instead, the plan places education funding in direct competition with other public services (e.g., health care);^[47] makes funding more reliant on sales tax revenue, which is more volatile than property taxes;^[48] does nothing for renters nor Texans who are struggling the most.^[49]

• Before it stalled due to a final-round filibuster, Nebraska’s Legislative Bill 388 (2023-2024) sought to cut property taxes by:  increasing excise taxes on cigarettes and electronic nicotine delivery systems (e.g., e-cigarettes); creating an excise tax on consumable hemp products, candy, and soft drinks; eliminating sales tax exemptions for veterinary services, dry cleaning services, and  lottery tickets; imposing taxes on digital advertising services; ending the Nebraska School District Property Tax Credit and transferring the revenue into a state-based tax relief program for school districts.^[50] While LB 388 included a state-Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansion, as the Open Sky Policy Institute observes, “for Nebraska’s lowers-income earners … the impact of proposed changes to the sales tax base and to some excise taxes will, on average, be greater than any savings that they might see through property tax reductions or an increase in the [EITC].”^[51]

• Preceding an unfavorable Legislative vote, the Wyoming House Revenue Committee passed House Bill 203 (2024) to offer a $1 million property tax exemption applied to the fair market value of single-family residential properties, effectively eliminating property taxes and, in turn, shrinking school district and local government budgets. To account for lost school and local revenues, Wyoming’s HB 203 included a mandate to increase the state’s sales and use tax by 2 percentage points.^[52] This proposal would have exacerbated Wyoming’s regressive tax code - according to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP), Wyoming has the 11th most regressive state and local tax system in the country.^[53]

• Beyond legislative-led efforts, groups are also circulating petitions in Nebraska and Michigan to eliminate property taxes through ballot initiatives. In Nebraska, the so-called EPIC (i.e., “Eliminate Property, Income, Corporate”) tax option would abolish all taxation (including the state’s personal income tax, corporate income tax, and property tax) and replace the lost revenue with a consumption or excise tax.^[54],[55] Per Tax Foundation calculations, the EPIC plan would require a statewide consumption tax rate of at least 21.6 percent, which would discourage the anticipated economic benefits of the tax overhaul.^[56] In Michigan, the AxeMiTax plan would get rid of property taxes, establish a two-third vote (supermajority) requirement to raise taxes at the local level,^[57] and, as a result, severely cut education funding.

• In November 2024, North Dakota voters decided not to repeal property taxes on the assessed value of a home. As the Tax Foundation explains, the constitutional amendment (Measure 4) would have made North Dakota the first state without property taxes. Eliminating property taxes, as Tax Foundation elaborates, “would not deliver on the economic benefits anticipated by its supporters and would undermine the state’s economic competitiveness ... outright repeal of the property tax is unsound and would ultimately force a shift to more economically harmful taxes and to state control of local revenues.”^[58]

• In November 2024, Florida voters approved Amendment 5, “Annual Adjustments to the Value of Certain Homestead Exemptions,” which adjusts the state’s second homestead exemption and any similar future ones annually for inflation growth. Florida Policy Institute cautioned that Amendment 5’s inflation adjustment was "a poorly structured solution" that would "further erode fiscal autonomy at the local level" and "lead local governments to either cut programs or increase taxes to make up the difference given that they have to have balanced budgets."^[59] These subsidies are projected to cost local governments across Florida approximately $406 million in the first five years of implementation, and by the fifth year of implementation, the inflation adjustment will cost Florida’s local governments an estimated $140 million annually.^[60]

As these cases show, proposals to eliminate property taxes often look to replace lost revenue through consumption taxes (i.e., sales or excise taxes) or fail to identify new sources of revenue. These proposals also challenge how public education is funded by: (i) making it dependent on consumption taxes, which are more volatile than property taxes;^[61] and (ii) shifting fiscal autonomy away from local governments (and school districts) in favor of state control. While advocates of these proposals justify property tax cuts as a necessary means to offer relief to taxpayers, they seldom target populations that need it most by opting for top-down, unitary, tax relief that benefits wealthy households, ignores renters, and jeopardizes public education.

No tax system is perfect, which is why it is important to consider how a state’s tax structure balances (if at all) a person’s ability to pay, the benefit principle, administration, and equity issues.^[62] Although property taxes are not perfect, they can be adjusted – instead of eliminated – to better serve the public and provide a stable, adequate, and reliable revenue source.^[63]

Notes

^[1] The state constitution specifies that counties, school districts, and municipalities shall, and special districts may, be authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized by general law to levy other taxes, for their respective purposes, except ad valorem taxes on intangible property and taxes prohibited by the constitution.

^[2] According to the Local Government Financial Information Handbook: "Special assessments are used to construct and maintain capital facilities and to fund certain services. Generally, the courts have deemed special assessments to be valid if the assessed property has derived a special benefit from the improvement or service and the assessment has been fairly and reasonably apportioned among the properties receiving the special benefit.” See Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2023 Local Government Financial Information Handbook,” January 2024, page 9, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/local-government/reports/lgfih23.pdf.

^[3] Florida Department of Revenue, “Just, Assessed, and Taxable Value Summary: Statewide Summary Statistics,”  November 2023,  https://floridarevenue.com/property/Pages/DataPortal.aspx.

^[4] In 1940, real property accounted for 84 percent of all assessed property. See Florida Department of Revenue, “2006DataBookFiles: Part 3: FL Property Tax Valuation State Totals of Net Assessed Value,” Florida Ad Valorem Valuation and Tax Data Book, Historical, February 9, 2023, https://floridarevenue.com/property/dataportal/Pages/default.aspx?path=/property/dataportal/Documents/PTO%20Data%20Portal/Databook%20Historical%20Data/2006DataBookFiles/Part%203.

^[5] The Florida Timeline, “2006 - Repeal of Intangibles Tax,” n.d., https://www.floridatimeline.org/timeline/2006-repeal-of-intangibles-tax/.

^[6] Aditya Aladangady, Andrew C. Chang, and Jacob Krimmel with assistance from Eva Ma, “Greater Wealth, Greater Uncertainty: Changes in Racial Inequality in the Survey of Consumer Finances,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 18, 2023, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/greater-wealth-greater-uncertainty-changes-in-racial-inequality-in-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20231018.html#fig1.

^[7] Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2001 Florida Tax Handbook,” n.d., page 16, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/revenues/reports/tax-handbook/taxhandbook2001.pdf.

^[8]  Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2010 Florida Tax Handbook,” n.d., page 21, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/revenues/reports/tax-handbook/taxhandbook2010.pdf.

^[9] Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2023 Florida Tax Handbook,” n.d., page 32, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/revenues/reports/tax-handbook/taxhandbook2023.pdf. The intangible tax revenue increase compared to FY 2009-2010 can be attributed to changes in the housing market and increased population over the decade.

^[10] The Florida Timeline, “2006 - Repeal of Intangibles Tax,” n.d., https://www.floridatimeline.org/timeline/2006-repeal-of-intangibles-tax/.

^[11] Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2023 Florida Tax Handbook,” n.d., page 125. The value of a 0.5 mill levy on stocks, bonds, and notes is estimated to be $532 million for FY 2024-25. The Florida Constitution states that the tax rate for both the recurring and non-recurring tax on intangible personal property cannot exceed 2 mills. At 2 mills, a tax on intangible property would raise $2.1 billion.

^[12] Carl Davis et al., “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition),” Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2024, https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/ITEP-Who-Pays-7th-edition.pdf.

^[13] FPI analysis of Florida’s Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “Statewide Expenditures and Revenues Reported by Florida's Counties, Municipalities, and Independent Special Districts,” n.d., http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/local-government/data/revenues-expenditures/stwidefiscal.cfm. Also Florida Department of Education, “School District Annual Financial Reports (AFR): 2021-22,” n.d., https://www.fldoe.org/finance/fl-edu-finance-program-fefp/school-dis-annual-financial-reports-af.stml. Statistics are derived from the Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR) "ad valorem tax profiles" for calendar years 1995-2024. Using 2022 as the comparison year for counties, municipalities, and school districts, property tax revenue equals $17.5 billion in counties, $6.8 billion in cities, and $17.5 billion in school districts over a 12-month period. Florida's Department of Education's School District Annual Financial Report estimates total local district tax revenue to be $11.1 billion in FY 2021-22. See also the Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR) "Statewide Expenditures and Revenues Reported by Florida's Counties, Municipalities, and Independent Special Districts" for county and city total revenues. Across Florida, counties collected nearly $100 billion and cities collected approximately $40 billion in 2021-2022. For school districts, Florida's Department of Education's School District Annual Financial Report for FY 2021-2022 estimates total school district revenue to be about $24 billion. As an estimate of how property taxes contribute to total revenues, FPI divided $17.5 billion by $100 billion for counties (18%); $6.8 billion by $40 billion for cities (17%); and both $17.5 billion (EDR) and $11.1 billion (FDE) by the total school district revenue reported by FDE, to derive a range of about 50% to 73%. The main difference between EDR's estimate and FDE is the use of different 12-month periods (calendar year versus fiscal year).

^[14] See Tax Policy Center, “State and Local Revenues and Expenditures, by Function,” May 26, 2020, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-and-local-revenues-and-expenditures-function.

^[15] FPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, "Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, 2021," June 29, 2023, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances.html. Property tax revenue is adjusted for inflation to the first half of 2024. Population statistics are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (1 year estimates). Without inflation adjustment, Florida’s property tax revenue, per the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, in 2020, was $35 billion ($1,671 per cap).

^[16]  Carl Davis et al., “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition),” 2024.

^[17] Federation of Tax Administrators, “State Sales Taxes and Vendor Discounts,” FTA, updated January 1, 2023, https://taxadmin.org/tax-rates-new/.

^[18] Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2023 Florida Tax Handbook,” n.d., page 170.

^[19]  Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “Florida Sales Tax Contributions from Households, Businesses, and Tourists,” n.d., http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/economy/index.cfm.

^[20] Florida Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR), “2023 Local Government Financial Information Handbook,” January 2024, page 143, http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/local-government/reports/lgfih23.pdf.

^[21] Florida statutes require local governments to establish a fiscal year running from October 1 of each year through September 30 of the following year. This is different from the statewide fiscal year, which runs from July 1 of each year through June 30 of the following year.

^[22] Tracy Gordon, “Critics Argue the Property Tax Is Unfair. Do They Have a Point?” Urban Institute and Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, March 9, 2020, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/critics-argue-property-tax-unfair-do-they-have-point.

^[23] Carl Davis et al., “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition),” 2024

^[24] Carl Davis et al., “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition),” 2024

^[25] Carl Davis et al., “Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition),” 2024

^[26] Keith Ihlanfeldt and Luke P. Rodgers, “Explaining Racial Gaps in Property Assessment and Property Taxation,” 2020, https://ihlanfeldt.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/racial_disparities_property_tax_July20211590.pdf.

^[27] Bernadette Atuahene, “Our taxes are too damn high: Institutional racism, property tax, assessments, and the fair housing act,” Northwestern University Law Review, volume 112 (no. 6), 2018, https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1348&context=nulr.

^[28] Andrew W. Kahrl, “The power to destroy: Discriminatory property assessments and the struggle for tax justice in Mississippi,” Journal of Southern History, volume 83(no. 3), 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/627004/pdf?casa_token=_9e_XmGt7Y4AAAAA:F0W-XS4kLNo7Co_3OXOoSe24-RetEc2YzzvTj8lnWKJDu0xJ5HOUGwP7U1Ae9vY4gNB8wXzeYZ9S.

^[29] Carl Davis & Meg Wiehe, “Taxes and Racial Equity: An Overview of State and Local Policy Impacts,” ITEP, March 31, 2021, https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/ITEP_Taxes-and-Racial-Equity-State-and-Local-Policy-Impacts-2.pdf.

^[30] Andre M. Perry, Jonathan Rothwell, and David Harshbarger, “The Devaluation of Assets in Black Neighborhoods,” Brookings Institute, November 27, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/devaluation-of-assets-in-black-neighborhoods/.

^[31] Florida Department of Revenue, “Save Our Homes Assessment Limitation and Portability Transfer (PT-112)”, 2021, https://floridarevenue.com/property/pages/taxpayers_exemptions.aspx.

^[32] Keith Ihlanfeldt, “Property Tax Homestead Exemptions: An Analysis of the Variance in Take-Up Rates Across Neighborhoods,” National Tax Journal, volume 74(no. 2), 2021, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/714168?casa_token=kG50um1IOJMAAAAA%3AmQScFANAvFK6Vrf+iqUSti7evVDKQ_kSJhT4eI45GIPZstb2NsDqub4Y-ZS7l9kisPLTvBU3_3mX05A&journalCode=ntj.

^[33] Keith Ihlanfeldt, “Property Tax Homestead Exemptions: An Analysis of the Variance in Take-Up Rates Across Neighborhoods,” National Tax Journal, volume 74(no. 2), 2021, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/714168?casa_token=kG50um1IOJMAAAAA%3AmQScFANAvFK6Vrf+iqUSti7evVDKQ_kSJhT4eI45GIPZstb2NsDqub4Y-ZS7l9kisPLTvBU3_3mX05A&journalCode=ntj.

^[34] Andrew W. Kahrl, “It’s Time to End the Quiet Cruelty of Property Taxes,” New York Times, April 11, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/11/opinion/property-taxes-racism-inequality.html.

^[35] Steve Bousquet, “‘Toxic’ Times: How Repeal of Florida’s Tax on Services Reverberates, 30 Years Later,” Tampa Bay Times, September 22, 2017, https://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/toxic-times-how-repeal-of-floridas-tax-on-services-reverberates-30-years/2338351/.

^[36] For a broader discussion, see: Michael Mazerov, “Expanding Sales Taxation of Services: Options and Issues,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 2009, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-10-09sfp.pdf.

^[37] This means that the portion of sales price below $1 million would be exempt such that only $500,000 would be subject to tax for a $1.5 million home sale.

^[38] Samantha Waxman, Carl Davis, and Erika Frankel, “States should enact, expand mansion taxes to advance fairness and shared prosperity,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, June 26, 2024, https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-should-enact-expand-mansion-taxes-to-advance-fairness-and.

^[39] Carl Davis and Brakeyshia Samms, “Preventing an Overload: How Property Tax Circuit Breakers Promote Housing Affordability,” Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, May 2023, https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/How-Property-Tax-Circuit-Breakers-Promote-Housing-Affordability.pdf.

^[40] Carl Davis and Brakeyshia Samms, “Preventing an Overload: How Property Tax Circuit Breakers Promote Housing Affordability,” 2023.

^[41] John H. Bowman, Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam Langley, and Bethany P. Paquin, “Property Tax Circuit Breakers: Fair and Cost-Effective Relief for Taxpayers,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, May 2009, https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/policy-focus-reports/property-tax-circuit-breakers.

^[42] Sarah Farkas and Iris J. Lav, “Targeted Property Tax Reform: Designing a Circuit Breaker for Florida,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 12, 2007, https://www.cbpp.org/research/targeted-property-tax-reform-designing-a-circuit-breaker-for-florida.

^[43] See https://workingfloridiansrebate.org/.

^[44] Florida House Bill 1371: Property Tax System Study, 2024, https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=80131.

^[45] Chandra Villanueva, “The Battle of Tax Cuts, Vouchers, and School Funding: A Tale of the 88th Texas Legislative Session,” Every Texan, May 2024, https://everytexan.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/The-Battle-of-Tax-Cuts-Vouchers-and-School-Funding_-A-Tale-of-the-88th-Texas-Legislative-Session-.pdf.

^[46] LSG, “The Property Tax Deal Explained: A Recap of the 88th Second Special Session,” August 2023, https://texaslsg.org/2023/08/23/the-property-tax-deal-explained-a-recap-of-the-88th-second-special-session/.

^[47] LSG, “The Property Tax Deal Explained: A Recap of the 88th Second Special Session,” August 2023, https://texaslsg.org/2023/08/23/the-property-tax-deal-explained-a-recap-of-the-88th-second-special-session/.

^[48] Chandra Villanueva, “The Battle of Tax Cuts, Vouchers, and School Funding: A Tale of the 88th Texas Legislative Session,” Every Texan, May 2024, https://everytexan.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/The-Battle-of-Tax-Cuts-Vouchers-and-School-Funding_-A-Tale-of-the-88th-Texas-Legislative-Session-.pdf.

^[49] Texas Legislative Council, “Analyses of the Proposed Constitutional Amendments: 88th Texas Legislature November 7, 2023, Election,” August 2023, page 19, https://tlc.texas.gov/docs/amendments/analyses23.pdf.

^[50] Nebraska Legislative Bill 388: Adopt the Property Tax Growth Limitation Act, the Advertising Services Tax Act, and the Property Tax Relief Act and Change Provisions Relating to Revenue and Taxation, 2023-2024, https://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=49980.

^[51] Open Sky Policy Institute, “Modeling Details How Amended Tax Package Would Impact Nebraskans,” April 2024, https://www.openskypolicy.org/modeling-details-how-amended-tax-package-would-impact-nebraskans.

^[52] Wyoming House Bill 203: Property Tax Reduction and Replacement Act, 2024, https://wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2024/HB0203.

^[53] Carl Davis et al., Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (7th edition), 2024, https://sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/itep/ITEP-Who-Pays-7th-edition.pdf. 

^[54] Fred Knapp, “Supporters step up efforts to promote EPIC tax option,” Nebraska Public Media, https://nebraskapublicmedia.org/en/news/news-articles/supporters-step-up-efforts-to-promote-epic-tax-option/.

^[55] Nebraska Secretary of State, “Petition Sponsor Sworn Statement: All Taxation in Nebraska Will Be Only Consumption or Excise Taxes,” SOS, October 2022, https://sos.nebraska.gov/sites/sos.nebraska.gov/files/doc/elections/Petitions/2024/Consumption%20or%20Excise%20Taxes%20Constitutional%20Amendment.pdf.

^[56] Jared Walczak and Manish Bhatt, “The Shortcomings of Nebraska’s EPIC Option,” Tax Foundation, March 2024, https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/state/nebraska-epic-option-consumption-tax/.

^[57]  AxeMITax, “Proposed: Summary of the Purpose of Proposed Constitutional Amendment,” 2023, https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/BSC-Announcements/Proposal/AxeMITax-Inc-Petition.pdf?rev=25bd416ff655484b82d111181010b3c0&hash=830419954380A8D8F49C46D25FC669EF.

^[58] Joseph Johns and Manish Bhatt, “North Dakota Considers Eliminating Property Taxes,” Tax Foundation, September 6, 2024, https://taxfoundation.org/blog/north-dakota-property-tax-ballot-measure/.

^[59] Sadaf Knight, “Statement in Opposition to Amendment 5,” Florida Policy Institute, October 30, 2024, https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/statement-in-opposition-to-amendment-5.   

^[60] Florida Office of Economic and Demographic Research's Revenue Estimating Conference, Analysis of HJR 7017, https://edr.state.fl.us/Content/conferences/revenueimpact/archives/2024/_pdf/page129-133.pdf.

^[61] Mark Robyn, Gayathri Venu & Justin Theal, “Tax Revenue Volatility Is Increasing in Most States,” The Pew Charitable Trusts, May 7, 2024, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2024/05/07/tax-revenue-volatility-is-increasing-in-most-states.

^[62] The ability-to-pay principle requires that the total tax burden is based on an individual’s capacity to bear it (e.g., the United States’ federal personal income tax). Per the benefit principle, those who pay a tax or fee ought to receive a benefit akin to private sector transactions (e.g., motor fuel taxes or tolls for roads). Tax administration issues include (i) how clear tax laws are to taxpayers, (ii) how convenient it is for a taxpayer to pay their taxes, (iii) how often tax laws ought to change, and (iv) the costs of collecting and implementing a tax, all of which determines how effective, efficient, and equitable a tax system is.

^[63] Tracy Gordon, “Critics Argue the Property Tax Is Unfair. Do They Have A Point?,” Tax Policy Center, March 9, 2020, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/critics-argue-property-tax-unfair-do-they-have-point.